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OUT OF THE STRIKE ZONE:  WHY GRAHAM 
V. FLORIDA MAKES IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
TO USE JUVENILE-AGE CONVICTIONS AS 
STRIKES TO MANDATE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE UNDER § 841(b)(1)(A) 
CHRISTOPHER J. WALSH* 
Life without parole is an incredibly harsh sentence.  Recognizing this fact, the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida held that life without parole 
is an unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment for any juvenile convicted of a 
nonhomicide crime.  This Comment takes the rule from Graham v. Florida and 
applies it to another context:  sentencing defendants who have been convicted of 
drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.  Under the sentencing scheme of   
§ 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant on his third strike—having two prior “felony drug 
offense” convictions—must be sentenced to life without parole. 
This Comment argues that counting juvenile-age prior convictions as strikes 
under § 841(b)(1)(A) to trigger mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional.  
Counting juvenile-age prior convictions as strikes effectively results in what 
Graham v. Florida forbids:  life without parole based on the defendant’s actions as 
a juvenile. 
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My object all sublime 
I shall achieve in time— 
To let the punishment fit the crime— 
The punishment fit the crime.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 represents an 
inherently moral judgment.3  By prohibiting “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” this constitutional provision embodies a humane ideal of 
American society.4  In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. 
Florida5 that juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole for 
nonhomicide crimes.6  This holding was the first time—outside of the death 
penalty context—that the Court categorically declared a particular 
sentencing practice “cruel and unusual” because it was disproportionate to 
the crime committed and the class of offenders.7  Although the full 
implications of this new Eighth Amendment rule are far from clear,8 
Graham v. Florida should motivate American society to reassess many 
other sentencing practices underlying the criminal justice system. 
Sentencing drug traffickers under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is one such 
practice that needs to be reexamined after Graham v. Florida.  Part of the 
Controlled Substances Act,9 § 841 is one of the federal government’s chief 
statutes for prosecuting drug trafficking.10  When a defendant has been 
convicted of trafficking certain large quantities of drugs, § 841(b)(1)(A) 
governs his sentence.11  Section 841(b)(1)(A) uses a “three strike” scheme 
                                                          
 1. W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO 68 (MacMillan & Co. 1928) (1885). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 3. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (asserting that the Eighth 
Amendment encompasses “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency”). 
 4. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing “[t]he 
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man”). 
 5. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 6. Id. at 2030 (interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to mean that 
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to life without parole 
because they must be afforded “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release [in the 
future] based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”). 
 7. See id. at 2022–23 (explaining that this context, “a categorical challenge to a term-
of-years sentence,” was one “the Court ha[d] not considered previously”). 
 8. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (detailing some of the post-Graham v. 
Florida legal developments). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 U.S.C.). 
 10. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (creating a comprehensive statutory structure for 
prosecuting and sentencing certain drug trafficking crimes). 
 11. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (governing sentencing for specific amounts of heroin, 
cocaine, PCP, methamphetamines, and other controlled substances). 
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where any prior “felony drug offense”12 convictions—which do not have to 
be prior convictions under this statute—count as strikes to enhance the 
defendant’s sentence.13  Under this structure, a defendant is subject to a ten-
year mandatory minimum on his first strike, a twenty-year mandatory 
minimum on his second strike, and mandatory life without parole on his 
third strike.14 
In the wake of Graham v. Florida, two federal circuit courts of appeals 
decided cases where the defendants challenged their § 841(b)(1)(A) life-
without-parole sentences.15  In one, United States v. Scott,16 Angelo Scott 
had been sentenced to life without parole even though his first two strikes 
were drug possession convictions when he was sixteen-years-old and 
seventeen-years-old.17  In the other, United States v. Graham,18 Donald 
Graham had been sentenced to life without parole even though his first 
strike resulted from a guilty plea to drug trafficking charges when he was 
seventeen-years-old.19  Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. 
Florida, both circuits upheld the defendants’ life-without-parole 
sentences.20 
This Comment argues that counting a defendant’s juvenile-age 
convictions as strikes to trigger mandatory life without parole under § 
841(b)(1)(A) violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.  Using juvenile-age convictions under § 841(b)(1)(A) 
effectively results in what Graham v. Florida categorically deemed 
unconstitutional:  life without parole because of the defendant’s actions 
when he was under eighteen-years-old.  To reach such a conclusion, this 
Comment utilizes the Eighth Amendment categorical challenge framework 
that the Supreme Court employed in Graham v. Florida. 
Still, this Comment argues that juvenile-age convictions need not be 
completely ignored at sentencing.  Although it is unconstitutional to use 
                                                          
 12. See infra note 85 (providing the definition of “felony drug offense” for purposes of 
§ 841(b)). 
 13. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (reviewing § 841(b)(1)(A)’s three 
strike system). 
 14. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 15. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2962 (2011); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
964 (2011).  At the time these defendants were prosecuted, the minimum amount of crack 
cocaine that placed an offender within § 841(b)(1)(A) was fifty grams, an amount which 
these defendants were convicted of trafficking.  United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d at 448; 
United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1011–12.  Congress has since raised the amount of crack 
cocaine for a defendant to reach § 841(b)(1)(A).  See infra note 88 (detailing the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010). 
 16. 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 964 (2011). 
 17. Id. at 1011–13. 
 18. 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2962 (2011). 
 19. Id. at 454. 
 20. Id. at 465; United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018. 
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juvenile-age convictions as strikes under § 841(b)(1)(A), judges should 
consider a defendant’s juvenile criminal history under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  
Section 3553(a) is designed to give judges broad discretion in sentencing, 
allowing them to consider the defendant as an individual.  As such, § 
3553(a) is the proper place for juvenile-age convictions to become a factor 
in sentencing. 
Part I of this Comment briefly overviews the Supreme Court’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence and the Court’s analysis in 
Graham v. Florida.  Part I also examines § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 3553, and it 
explores the four legitimate penological goals of sentencing:  retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  Last, Part I details the courts’ 
decisions in United States v. Scott and United States v. Graham. 
Part II uses the analytical framework that the Supreme Court employed 
in Graham v. Florida to argue that life without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A) 
due to juvenile-age strikes is unconstitutional.  Part II first argues that 
objective indicia show jurisdictions vary tremendously in how they view 
this sentencing practice.  Part II next asserts that defendants prosecuted 
under § 841 with juvenile-age prior convictions are not sufficiently 
culpable to deserve life without parole, and no penal theory adequately 
justifies life without parole for this class of offenders.  Finally, Part II 
claims that international norms surrounding juvenile criminal conduct and 
drug offenses support the conclusion that this sentencing practice is cruel 
and unusual.  Part III recommends, however, that judges should still 
consider a defendant’s prior juvenile-age convictions at sentencing under § 
3553(a). 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”21  The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is the best-known 
and most-litigated component of the Eighth Amendment; the Excessive 
Bail and Excessive Fines Clauses have proven far less controversial.22 
                                                          
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  For the history of the concept of “cruel and unusual” 
punishments in English common law and how the American Framers incorporated that 
concept into the Eighth Amendment, see generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:”  The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
 22. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998) (noting that the Supreme 
Court “had little occasion to interpret, and ha[d] never actually applied, the Excessive Fines 
Clause” prior to that case); id. at 344 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“For the first time in its 
history, the Court strikes down a fine as excessive under the Eighth Amendment.”); Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting that a trial court’s 
determination in fixing reasonable bail necessitates discretion and thus an “[a]ppellate 
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1. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence prior to 
 Graham v. Florida 
Through the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Framers 
intended to unconditionally prohibit certain methods of inherently barbaric 
punishments,23 like torture.24  In view of the “open-ended quality”25 of the 
amendment’s text, however, Chief Justice Warren recognized the dynamic 
nature of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and declared that this 
provision must be interpreted in light of “evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”26  While some members of 
the Court have attempted to define a workable set of Eighth Amendment 
parameters,27 Justice Murphy’s passage in an unpublished draft of a 
dissenting opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber28 illustrates the 
difficulty of this task: 
More than any other provision in the Constitution, the prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment depends largely, if not entirely, upon the 
humanitarian instincts of the judiciary.  We have nothing to guide us in 
defining what is cruel and unusual apart from our consciences.  A 
punishment which is considered fair today may be considered cruel 
tomorrow.  And so we are not dealing here with a set of absolutes.  Our 
                                                          
[c]ourt should only reverse for clear abuse of discretion or other mistake of law”). 
 23. See Granucci, supra note 21, at 860–65 (arguing that the Framers’ intention was to 
bar tortuous punishments, but that such a reading was inconsistent with the English 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, which was meant to proscribe excessive 
punishments); see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (declaring the 
punishments of drawing and quartering, public dissecting, burning alive, and disemboweling 
to always be cruel and unusual, regardless of crime). 
 24. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (establishing that “[p]unishments are 
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death”); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136 (stating “it 
is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of 
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden” under the Eighth Amendment). 
 25. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 13–
14 (1980) (“It is possible to construe [the Eighth Amendment] as covering only those 
punishments that would have been regarded as ‘cruel and unusual’ in 1791, but that 
construction seems untrue to the open-ended quality of the language.”). 
 26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (including Trop’s “evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society” language in the majority opinion); see also Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (claiming “[t]he standard of 
extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment . . . 
[because] [t]he standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the 
basic mores of society change”). 
 27. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), for example, Justice Brennan detailed 
“four principles by which we may determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”  
Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to Justice 
Brennan, a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is:  (1) degrading to human dignity; (2) 
arbitrarily inflicted; (3) unanimously rejected by society; or (4) completely unnecessary.  Id.  
Justice Brennan presumed, however, no state would pass a law that obviously violated any 
one of these four principles, so the convergence of these principles would ultimately 
determine if a punishment is cruel and unusual.  Id. at 282. 
 28. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).  In Resweber, the Court upheld the execution of a black 
teenager even though the state’s first attempt at electrocution had failed.  Id. at 466. 
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decision must necessarily spring from the mosaic of our beliefs, our 
backgrounds and the degree of our faith in the dignity of the human 
personality.29 
In addition to forbidding certain modes of punishment altogether, the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause embodies the principle of 
proportionality.  In 1910, the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States30 
first invalidated a sentence because it was disproportionate to the 
underlying crime, reasoning “it is a precept of justice that punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”31  The Court has 
since explained this principle by asserting that “[e]ven one day in prison 
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a 
common cold.”32  More recently, the Supreme Court refined its 
proportionality doctrine for term-of-years sentences, asserting that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a “narrow proportionality 
principle” that only forbids “grossly disproportionate” sentences rather than 
requiring “strict proportionality.”33  Under this narrow proportionality 
                                                          
 29. Frank Murphy, Unpublished draft opinion for Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber 
(1946) (Box 150, Folder 4, Harold Hitz Burton Papers, Library of Congress), as reprinted 
in David J. Danelski, The Riddle of Frank Murphy’s Personality and Jurisprudence, 13 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 189, 196 (1988). 
 30. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 31. Id. at 367.  The Weems Court held a fifteen-year prison sentence, which included 
being chained from wrist to ankle and compelled to work “hard and painful labor,” was an 
unconstitutional punishment for the crime of falsifying an official public document.  Id. at 
381–82.  Although Weems was the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a 
sentence for being disproportionate, Justice Field had laid the groundwork for this idea 
eighteen years earlier.  See O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1892) (Field, J., 
dissenting) (arguing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is directed “against all 
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the 
offences charged”). 
 32. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
invalidated a California statute that made the “status” of narcotics addiction a crime for 
which an offender could be prosecuted and jailed for ninety days).  Justice Field, in his 
O’Neil dissent, also offered analogies, like the one below, to demonstrate why the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause must contain a proportionality component: 
The state may, indeed, make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offence to be 
punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if it should count 
the drops in a single glass, and make thereby a thousand offences, and thus extend 
the punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an imprisonment of almost 
indefinite duration. 
O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 33. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Kennedy’s 
Harmelin opinion also sets the current analytical model by which the Supreme Court 
evaluates whether a particular term-of-years sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 
underlying crime.  First, the Court compares the gravity of the offense and the severity of 
the sentence imposed.  Id. at 1005.  “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . 
. . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,” the Court then evaluates the 
defendant’s sentence as compared to sentences received by other offenders in the same 
jurisdiction and to sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions.  Id.  If these 
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses “validate an initial judgment that [the] 
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principle, the Supreme Court has controversially upheld such sentences as 
life without parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine,34 twenty-five years 
to life for felony grand theft of three golf clubs,35 and fifty years to life for 
shoplifting videotapes.36 
Capital punishment has presented the Court with difficulties in its 
proportionality doctrine.  Despite many persuasive arguments to abolish the 
death penalty,37 American society has not outlawed capital punishment.  
Still, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of categorical death 
penalty rules to define Eighth Amendment proportionality standards 
because “death is different.”38  The Court in Atkins v. Virginia,39 for 
example, held the mentally-disabled can never be death-eligible.40  Also, 
Roper v. Simmons41 declared capital punishment to be completely off-limits 
for anyone under the age of eighteen.42  Further, Kennedy v. Louisiana43 
established the bright line that the death penalty is unconstitutional for all 
nonhomicide crimes against individual persons.44  In these categorical 
death penalty cases, the Supreme Court used a two-step analytical 
framework that differed from its term-of-years narrow proportionality 
approach.45 
                                                          
sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is unconstitutional.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 961, 996 (majority opinion).  Interestingly, just one year later, the state statute 
at issue in Harmelin was invalidated by the Michigan Supreme Court under the state’s 
constitution.  See People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870–74 (Mich. 1992) (holding the 
state constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual” punishments reached broader than the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishments). 
 35. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17–18, 30–31 (2003). 
 36. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003). 
 37. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78–81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment) (outlining a number of arguments that undermine the three prominent 
justifications—incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution—advanced in favor of capital 
punishment). 
 38. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (opinion of Marshall, J.); accord 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“When the law punishes by death, it risks 
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to 
decency and restraint.”). 
 39. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 40. Id. at 314–16, 321 (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). 
 41. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 42. Id. at 574 (holding eighteen is “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought 
to rest” since society frequently uses that age to distinguish youth from adulthood).  In 
coming to this conclusion, the Roper Court relied on three general differences between 
juveniles and adults:  (1) juveniles are less mature and responsible, characteristics which 
produce “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”; (2) juveniles are more 
susceptible to “negative influences and outside pressures”; and (3) a juvenile’s character is 
not as well developed as that of an adult.  Id. at 569–70. 
 43. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 44. Id. at 438 (holding that the defendant, a child rapist, could not be sentenced to 
death). 
 45. In the categorical rule context, the Court first considered “objective indicia of 
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice,” to see if a 
national consensus existed either for or against the challenged sentence.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 
563.  If a consensus were found, it was “entitled to great weight,” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434, 
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2. Graham v. Florida:  The Supreme Court’s new categorical 
 proportionality rule 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Graham v. Florida46 
and Sullivan v. Florida,47 many commentators believed the Court would 
issue two major Eighth Amendment opinions about sentencing juveniles.48  
In the end, however, the Court’s new rule announced in Graham v. Florida 
mooted Sullivan.49 
Terrence Graham was sixteen-years-old when he was charged with 
attempted armed robbery, pleaded guilty, and was thus sentenced to three 
years probation.50  Soon after Graham was out of jail, though, police again 
arrested him in connection with another series of armed robberies.51  
Because Graham had violated the terms of his probation, he was subject to 
a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of life in 
prison.52  The state recommended that Graham, still a juvenile, should 
receive thirty years imprisonment.53  The trial judge sentenced him to the 
statutory maximum of life without parole.54  Florida’s intermediate 
appellate court affirmed Graham’s sentence,55 and the Florida Supreme 
Court denied review.56  Upon Graham’s petition, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.57 
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-member majority in Graham v. 
                                                          
but such consensus was never determinative of Eighth Amendment standards by itself.  
Instead, the Court then “determine[d], in the exercise of [its] own independent judgment, 
whether the [sentence was] disproportionate punishment.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.  At this 
second stage of the analysis, the Court turned to “standards elaborated by controlling 
precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”  Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.  Lastly, the 
Court often considered standards set by the international community to be persuasive.  E.g., 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (looking to various international sources as “instructive” in 
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
 46. 129 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (2009) (granting certiorari). 
 47. 129 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (2009) (granting certiorari).  In Sullivan, the defendant 
challenged the life-without-parole sentence he received as a thirteen-year-old.  Brief for 
Petitioner at 2–5, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-7621). 
 48. E.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis:  Why Two Juvenile Sentence Cases?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(May 4, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=9424 (observing that the Supreme 
Court “set[] the stage for two rulings, perhaps with different potential outcomes,” when it 
took both Graham v. Florida and Sullivan). 
 49. See Sullivan, 130 S. Ct. at 2059 (dismissing the writ of certiorari as having been 
improvidently granted). 
 50. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010). 
 51. Id. at 2018–19. 
 52. Id. at 2019. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 2019–20.  Because Florida did not have a parole system available for Graham, 
his life sentence was effectively life without parole.  Id. at 2020. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Graham v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (2009). 
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Florida.58  Since Graham’s case presented “a categorical challenge to a 
term-of-years sentence,” the majority employed the two-step analytical 
approach used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy.59 
Under this framework, the Court first examined the “objective indicia” 
of how various jurisdictions viewed the sentencing practice at issue.60  
Objective indicia include both legislative enactments and how frequently 
the sentence is actually imposed.61  At this first step, the Court found a 
national consensus against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders.62  Even though many jurisdictions allowed such sentences by 
statute, few imposed them in practice.63  This national consensus was thus 
“entitled to great weight,” but it was not dispositive; the Court needed to 
proceed to the second analytical step.64 
At the second step, the Court considered a number of factors in 
exercising its “independent judgment.”65  To start, the Court evaluated “the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”66  
On this point, the Court asserted that juvenile nonhomicide offenders have 
diminished culpability and thus do not deserve life without parole.67  Next, 
the analysis turned to whether the sentence served the penological goals of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.68  The Court 
concluded that none of these four goals supported life without parole for 
juveniles who did not commit homicide because of the unique 
characteristics of this class of offenders.69 
The Court’s own reasoning, therefore, confirmed the national consensus 
                                                          
 58. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor fully joined Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Graham v. Florida.  130 S. Ct. at 2017.  Chief Justice Roberts, although 
agreeing with the majority that Graham’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, 
concurred separately because he would have relied solely on the Court’s narrow 
proportionality methodology and the reasoning of Roper to come to this conclusion.  See id. 
at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) (believing there was “no need to invent a 
new constitutional rule of dubious provenance”). 
 59. Id. at 2022–23 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2046 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of 
offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it previously 
reserved for death penalty cases alone.”). 
 60. Id. at 2023 (majority opinion). 
 61. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)). 
 62. Id. at 2023–26 (concluding that this sentencing practice was “exceedingly rare”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2026 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2026–28. 
 68. Id. at 2026, 2028 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 69. Id. at 2028–30 (discussing juveniles’ lack of maturity, ability to change, and other 
similar traits). 
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that this sentencing practice was cruel and unusual.70  As a result, the Court 
declared that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot receive 
life without parole, for they must be given “some meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”71  The 
majority elaborated, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the 
possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before 
adulthood will remain behind bars for life,” but this amendment “does 
forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders 
never will be fit to reenter society.”72  Last, the Court verified its 
conclusion by turning to international standards, which confirmed that this 
sentencing practice had been “rejected the world over.”73 
Dissenting, Justice Thomas opined that Graham’s life-without-parole 
sentence would not have been cruel and unusual at the time of the 
Founding and that the judgments of modern legislatures, judges, and juries 
on this question showed that society had not evolved to thinking the 
practice was cruel and unusual.74  In a concurring opinion,75 Justice Stevens 
responded to Justice Thomas’ view of the Eighth Amendment as too 
“rigid” and asserted:  “Society changes.  Knowledge accumulates.  We 
learn, sometimes, from our mistakes.”76  To Justice Stevens, “[s]tandards of 
decency . . . will never stop [evolving].”77 
Most legal developments after Graham v. Florida have focused on the 
practicalities of how to implement this new rule, especially in jurisdictions, 
like Florida, that had previously abolished their parole systems.78  In 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 2030. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2033–34. 
 74. Id. at 2044–53 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’ 
dissent in full, and Justice Alito joined in part because he did not believe the record 
warranted addressing some of the issues that Justice Thomas argued.  See id. at 2058–59 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (maintaining that since Graham had abandoned his as-applied 
challenge under the Court’s narrow proportionality framework, he would not reach that 
issue which was not properly preserved). 
 75. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined Justice Stevens’ concurrence as well as the 
opinion of the Court.  Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 76. Id.  Justice Stevens’ language cannot help but remind a reader of Justice Holmes’ 
famous passage declaring: 
The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience . . . .  The substance 
of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what 
is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to 
which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past. 
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1881). 
 77. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 78. E.g., David Ovalle, Ruling on Young, Violent Lifers Puts Florida Justice on the 
Spot, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 26, 2010, (on file with Law Review), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/09/25/v-fullstory/1842695/ruling-on-young-violent-
lifers.html (discussing two possible solutions for how Florida could comply with Graham v. 
Florida’s mandate, with both solutions calling for long-term prison sentences with the 
possibility of parole). 
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addition, state courts continue to assert that Graham v. Florida should not 
be further expanded, holding that juveniles who do commit homicide may 
be subject to life without parole.79  While Graham v. Florida’s holding 
reached broadly, many questions regarding the expansiveness of its 
analysis remain. 
B. Sentencing Drug Traffickers in the Federal System 
In response to the escalating problems of illegal drug use during the 
1960’s,80 Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as part of 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.81  
Within the CSA, one of the federal government’s main statutes for 
prosecuting drug traffickers is 21 U.S.C. § 841.82  This statute’s first 
subsection, § 841(a), makes it a federal crime to “knowingly or 
intentionally . . . manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”83 
The statute’s next subsection, § 841(b), creates the sentencing scheme 
for defendants convicted under § 841(a).84  A defendant’s sentence under § 
841(b) is largely based on two factors:  (1) the quantity of drugs he was 
trafficking and (2) the number of prior “felony drug offense”85 convictions 
                                                          
 79. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 53–54 (2011) (holding life without 
parole for a juvenile convicted of homicide does not violate the Eighth Amendment); State 
v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 376–78 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
3070 (2011); State v. Golka, 796 N.W.2d 198, 215–16 (Neb. 2011) (same). 
 80. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 6 (1970) (emphasizing the 322% increase in the 
number of drug-related arrests in 1968 compared to those made in 1960); see also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801(2) (2006) (noting the substantial negative impact of unlawful drug activity on the 
American public’s health and general welfare). 
 81. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 82. While § 841(a) criminalizes the actual commission of drug trafficking, federal 
prosecutors also regularly use this statute’s conspiracy analog, 21 U.S.C. § 846, to go after 
drug traffickers.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 199, 205–07 (1993) (detailing prosecutorial strategy in charging drug 
traffickers); cf. David Marusarz, Note, Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry:  Preserving 
the Policy Behind the Statute of Limitations in Money Laundering Conspiracies, 45 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 253, 266 & n.59 (2010) (citing J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME 31 (2d ed. 2006)) (explaining why prosecutors also frequently bring conspiracy 
charges in white collar crime prosecutions).  When a defendant is convicted for conspiracy 
to traffic controlled substances under § 846, he is subject to the sentencing scheme of § 
841(b).  See § 846 (“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined 
in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, 
the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”). 
 83. Id. § 841(a).  “Controlled substance” is a term of art for purposes of this law and is 
defined in § 802.  Id. § 802(6). 
 84. Id. § 841(b). 
 85. The term “felony drug offense” is defined as “an offense that is punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or 
foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, 
anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.”  Id. § 802(44).  In a case with § 
841(b)(1)(A) specifically at issue, the Supreme Court held the term “felony drug offense” is 
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on his record.86  Regarding the first factor, § 841(b) creates different tiers 
of mandatory minimum sentences based on the quantity of drugs at issue.87  
Of the various tiers, § 841(b)(1)(A) governs the highest quantities of 
drugs.88 
Once a defendant qualifies for sentencing under § 841(b)(1)(A), the 
second factor—his number of prior “felony drug offense” convictions—
becomes relevant.89  Congress utilized this “strike” system in § 841(b) 
primarily to deter recidivism and incapacitate repeat-offenders.90  A prior 
conviction under any number of federal and state drug laws, not just § 
841(a), can qualify as a “felony drug offense” for purposes of this 
subsection.91  Under § 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant who has no prior “felony 
drug offense” convictions is subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum 
sentence.92  A defendant with one prior “felony drug offense” conviction is 
subject to a twenty-year mandatory minimum.93  And a defendant within § 
841(b)(1)(A) on his third strike—meaning he has “two or more prior 
convictions for a felony drug offense”—must be sentenced to a “mandatory 
                                                          
defined exclusively by § 802(44) and does not incorporate the definition of “felony” found 
in § 802(13).  See Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008) (ruling “felony drug 
offense” to be a term of art under the CSA); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 
(2000) (stating that courts must follow an explicit definition when included in a statute). 
 86. See § 841(b) (setting unlawful quantities for various controlled substances and 
using increased penalties based on prior convictions). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (covering such drug quantities as “1 kilogram or more of a 
mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of heroin,” “50 grams or more of a 
mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base,” “100 grams or more of 
phencyclidine (PCP),” “50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts 
of its isomers,” and others).  In the summer of 2010, Congress raised the § 841(b)(1)(A) 
floor to 280 grams of crack cocaine.  See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
§ 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)) (increasing 
the minimum threshold of crack cocaine to 280 grams partly to alleviate the perceived racial 
bias between crack cocaine and powder cocaine quantities). 
 89. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 10 (1970) (intending the escalating mandatory 
minimum sentencing scheme “to serve as a strong deterrent to those who otherwise might 
wish to engage in the illicit traffic, while also providing a means for keeping those found 
guilty of violations out of circulation”).  The second-highest tier of sentences, § 
841(b)(1)(B), covers lesser quantities of controlled substances and also uses a strike system.  
§ 841(b)(1)(B).  A defendant falling within § 841(b)(1)(B) who does not have a prior 
“felony drug offense” conviction is subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence and 
a maximum sentence of forty years.  Id.  A defendant subject to § 841(b)(1)(B) with “a prior 
conviction for a felony drug offense,” however, must receive a mandatory minimum of ten 
years and faces a maximum term of life without parole.  Id.  Thus, this Comment’s 
arguments about the unconstitutionality of sentencing a defendant to life without parole 
based on juvenile-age prior convictions could also apply to § 841(b)(1)(B), but this 
Comment focuses on § 841(b)(1)(A) because § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates a life without parole 
sentence on the defendant’s third strike and because judges rarely impose a maximum 
sentence available by statute. 
 91. See supra note 85 (providing the expansive definition of “felony drug offense”). 
 92. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 93. Id. 
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term of life imprisonment without release.”94 
For example, a defendant convicted of trafficking sixty grams of 
methamphetamine falls into § 841(b)(1)(A).95  If the defendant does not 
have a prior “felony drug offense” conviction on his record, he faces a 
minimum sentence of ten years in prison.96  If the defendant is on his 
second strike because he was previously convicted of possessing crack 
cocaine, he is subject to a sentence of at least twenty years.97  And if that 
defendant is on his third strike, having been convicted of possessing crack 
cocaine on two prior occasions, he must be sentenced to life without 
parole.98 
In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 addresses the “imposition of a sentence” 
generally, and this statute overlays all criminal sentencing in the federal 
system, including sentencing under § 841(b).99  The basic command of § 
3553(a) is that a defendant should receive “a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to comply with certain sentencing goals in the 
particular case.100  Section 3553(a) delineates a host of factors for federal 
judges to consider when sentencing a defendant, including:  the nature and 
circumstances of the offense,101 the defendant’s history and 
characteristics,102 the deterrent value of the sentence,103 the need to provide 
the defendant with educational or vocational training,104 the types of 
sentences available,105 any recommended sentencing range in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines,106 the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among like defendants,107 and the need to provide restitution to 
any victims.108  As such, § 3553(a) grants judges broad discretion to 
sentence the defendant as an individual, based on the specific facts of the 
case.109 
                                                          
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (covering “50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its 
salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers”). 
 96. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
 100. Id. § 3553(a).  See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of “Parsimony Clause” of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a), Providing that District Court 
Shall Impose Sentence Sufficient, but Not Greater Than Necessary, to Comply with § 
3553(a)(2), 38 A.L.R. FED. 2D 147, 147–200 (2009) (outlining how courts have treated this 
“parsimony clause”). 
 101. § 3553(a)(1). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 104. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 105. Id. § 3553(a)(3). 
 106. Id. § 3553(a)(4). 
 107. Id. § 3553(a)(6). 
 108. Id. § 3553(a)(7). 
 109. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (promoting a theory of 
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C. The Penological Goals of Sentencing 
The Supreme Court has only explicitly recognized four penological goals 
as legitimate:  retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.110  
Of these four, legislatures have flexibility in choosing why to punish 
criminals, for “the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any 
one penological theory.”111 
1. Retribution 
The penological goal of retribution aims to punish the defendant as 
repayment for his past crime.112  Retribution has been termed “the oldest 
theory of punishment,”113 for human impulses seem to naturally desire that 
an individual who commits a prohibited act should be punished.114  As 
Justice Marshall noted, however, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause serves as “insulation from our baser selves” since it “limits the 
avenues through which vengeance can be channeled.”115  Thus, modern 
retributivists usually justify punishment because “it tends to ‘restore an 
order of fairness which was disrupted by the criminal’s criminal act.’”116 
Supporters of the retributive penal theory can be generally divided into 
two camps:  harm-based retributivists and intent-based retributivists.117  
Harm-based retributivists focus on the external consequences of crime, 
                                                          
individualized sentencing for every defendant convicted of a crime). 
 110. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion)). 
 111. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment); accord Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (acknowledging 
the legislature’s discretion to identify the goals of criminal punishment). 
 112. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (9th ed. 2009) (defining retribution as 
“[p]unishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense committed; requital”).  
Immanuel Kant’s work laid the basis for the retributivist theory of punishment.  See 
generally IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE:  PART I OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797) 
(rationalizing that punishment is only legitimate when a person deserves it because of his 
past wrongdoing). 
 113. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)(6), at 29 (4th ed. 2003). 
 114. Jeremy Bentham, a pioneer in the Anglo-American philosophy of law who is best-
known for setting the modern foundation of utilitarianism, observed that “[t]he great merit 
of the law of retaliation is its simplicity,” for “[n]o other imaginable plan can for its extent 
find so easy an entrance into the apprehension, or sit so easy on the memory.”  JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 93 (James T. McHugh ed., Prometheus Books 
2009) (1775).  At the same time, however, Bentham recognized the “variety of objections” 
to purely retributive punishment, so he asserted that only offenses against the person can 
justify retribution as a rationale for punishment.  Id. at 93–94. 
 115. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(elaborating that “[w]ere this not so, the [Eighth Amendment’s] language would be empty 
and a return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case”). 
 116. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the 
Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 735 (1988) (quoting JOHN M. FINNIS, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 128 (1983)). 
 117. Id. at 735–36. 
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believing punishment is justified by, and measured in relation to, “the 
culpable causing of a prohibited harm.”118  Intent-based retributivists, on 
the other hand, emphasize “what [the defendant] was trying to do, intended 
to do and believed he was doing, rather than upon the actual consequences 
of his conduct.”119  The Supreme Court has generally favored an intent-
based retributivist model,120 demonstrated by Justice O’Connor’s often-
cited language in Tison v. Arizona121:  “The heart of the retribution 
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.”122 
2. Deterrence 
While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the theory of deterrence 
generally,123 this overarching penological goal actually breaks down into 
two concepts:  general deterrence and specific deterrence.124  General 
deterrence is the notion that punishing a criminal for his illegal conduct 
will stop others from committing future crimes because they will fear being 
punished in a similar manner.125  As Justice Holmes explained this idea, 
“[p]ublic policy sacrifices the individual to the general good.”126  General 
deterrence, thus, is an outward-focused doctrine.127  This penological 
theory has had many supporters—most notably Jeremy Bentham, who 
                                                          
 118. Id. at 735. 
 119. Id. at 736. 
 120. See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 81, 106–07 (2010) 
(claiming that the Supreme Court took an uncharacteristic approach with its “harm-based 
retributivist turn” in Kennedy v. Louisiana). 
 121. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 122. Id. at 149, 158 (reasoning that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual for a 
felony-murder conviction when the defendant was significantly involved in committing the 
felony and exhibited “reckless indifference to human life”); accord id. at 180–81 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (noting that retribution can only be a constitutionally valid basis for 
punishment when it involves the criminal justice system channeling the public’s instinct of 
an “eye for an eye”). 
 123. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (including deterrence as one of the four 
legitimate penological theories). 
 124. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03, at 15 (5th ed. 2009) 
(distinguishing general from specific deterrence). 
 125. See LAFAVE, supra note 113, § 1.5(a)(4), at 28–29 (summarizing the concept of 
deterrence and the major scholarship surrounding this doctrine); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971) (describing general deterrence as effective because 
“threats can reduce crime by causing a change of heart, induced by the unpleasantness of the 
specific consequences threatened”). 
 126. HOLMES, supra note 76, at 48. 
 127. See PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 53–54 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 
1992) (“General deterrence seeks to further the aim of crime prevention by setting it so as to 
induce other citizens who might be tempted to commit crime to desist out of fear of the 
penalty.” (emphasis added)); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law 
Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259–60 (1972) (noting that the idea of using law 
enforcement to deter people, other than the person apprehended, has always been a basic 
component of crime control). 
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argued that general deterrence “ought to be the chief end of punishment.”128 
Specific deterrence, by contrast, focuses on reducing the threat of future 
crime from a particular defendant.129  According to this penological model, 
punishment is warranted to deter the criminal “by giving him an unpleasant 
experience he will not want to endure again.”130  The idea is that a criminal 
will learn his lesson while incarcerated and, therefore, will steer clear of 
future crime upon reentering society.131 
3. Incapacitation 
Like specific deterrence, incapacitation focuses on the individual 
offender.132  Under this theory, imprisonment (and sometimes capital 
punishment) is justified because it removes the offender from society so 
that he cannot commit more crimes.133  As Professor Packer explained, 
incapacitation is “[t]he simplest justification for any punishment that 
involves the use of physical restraint [because,] for its duration[,] the 
person on whom it is being inflicted loses entirely or nearly so the capacity 
to commit further crimes.”134  At its base, then, the penological theory of 
incapacitation relies on the criminal justice system’s ability to predict who 
is likely to commit future crimes.135 
In recent decades, the United States has increasingly turned to the 
strategy of incapacitation.136  The United States currently has the highest 
                                                          
 128. BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 62.  Bentham explained the rationale of general 
deterrence as follows: 
If we could consider an offence which has been committed as an isolated fact, the 
like of which would never recur, punishment would be useless.  It would be only 
adding one evil to another.  But when we consider that an unpunished crime leaves 
the path of crime open not only to the same delinquent, but also to all those who 
may have the same motives and opportunities for entering upon it, we perceive that 
the punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a source of security to all. 
Id. 
 129. See PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 127, at 53 (stating that individual 
deterrence aims to establish a punishment that is sufficient to prevent the offender from 
reoffending). 
 130. LAFAVE, supra note 113, § 1.5(a)(1), at 26–27. 
 131. See DRESSLER, supra note 124, § 2.03, at 15 (explaining specific deterrence as 
“intimidation” because the defendant’s “punishment reminds him that if he returns to a life 
of crime, he will experience more pain”). 
 132. As Professor Ryan noted, scholars often link the theories of incapacitation and 
specific deterrence because specific deterrence, in its broadest form, can be thought of as 
encompassing incapacitation.  See Ryan, supra note 120, at 109 n.153 (providing sources 
that tie the concepts of incapacitation and specific deterrence). 
 133. Id. at 109–10.  But see id. at 110 n.154 (noting the reality that a “prisoner does have 
the opportunity to commit future crimes in prison”). 
 134. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968). 
 135. See id. at 49 (suggesting that the theory of incapacitation bases its assessment of an 
individual’s personality on the particular crime he committed and then predicts that he will 
commit similar crimes in the future). 
 136. See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3 
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_ 
Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf (describing how the United States prison population 
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incarceration rate in the world,137 and in 2008, for the first time in the 
nation’s history, more than one in every 100 American adults was 
incarcerated.138  According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the United 
States had 1,613,740 prisoners in federal and state custody by the end of 
2009.139  The DOJ’s statistics also detail larger incarceration trends.  From 
2000–2009, for example, the United States’ total prison population grew by 
222,479 inmates, a 6.2% increase.140  Also, more broadly, the federal 
imprisonment rate rose from 21 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1990 to 61 
per 100,000 U.S. residents in 2009.141 
4. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is “[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal’s 
character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without 
committing other crimes.”142  The goal of rehabilitation looks at the present 
and future.143  The “rehabilitative ideal” has long been a part of the 
American criminal justice system, emerging alongside the first United 
States penitentiaries in the early 1800’s.144  In fact, rehabilitation was the 
preferred penological theory in the United States for much of the twentieth 
                                                          
has increased over the past three decades). 
 137. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 472 & n.60 (2010) (noting 
how the United States is the country with the world’s highest incarceration rate and the 
extensive media coverage this fact has received). 
 138. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 136, at 3 (providing statistics and 
asserting that growing prison populations in recent years have “saddl[ed] cash-strapped 
states with soaring costs they can ill afford [while] failing to have a clear impact either on 
recidivism or overall crime”). 
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter DOJ 2009 
PRISON REPORT], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.  In addition 
to these inmates in the federal and state systems, several hundred thousand prisoners are 
also in local jails every year.  See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 136, at 5 
(pointing out the number of inmates in local jails during 2008). 
 140. DOJ 2009 PRISON REPORT, supra note 139, at 2 tbl.1. 
 141. Id. at 3 fig.3. 
 142. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398–99 (9th ed. 2009). 
 143. Professor Morris’ description of therapy illustrates the nature of this penological 
goal: 
Therapy is not a response to a person who is at fault.  We respond to an individual, 
not because of what he has done, but because of some condition from which he is 
suffering.  If he is no longer suffering from the condition, treatment no longer has a 
point.  Punishment, then, focuses on the past; therapy, on the present.  Therapy is 
normally associated with compassion for what one undergoes, not resentment for 
what one has illegitimately done. 
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), as reprinted in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 127, at 18. 
 144. Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation:  Policy, 
Practice, and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 2000 111, 114 (2000) (citing GUSTAVE DE 
BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964) (1833); DAVID J. 
ROTHMAN, DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:  SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (1971)). 
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century.145  As the Supreme Court noted, the justification for rehabilitation 
was rooted in “a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the 
inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal 
activity upon his return to society.”146 
Starting in the 1970’s, however, many scholars began to question the 
plausibility of rehabilitation.147  In 1974, sociologist Robert Martinson 
famously summarized his findings after studying the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation by declaring, “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the 
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable 
effect on recidivism.”148  From the 1970’s until today, the American 
criminal justice system—to the delight of some and to the dismay of 
others149—has significantly turned away from rehabilitation as a primary 
goal.150  Nonetheless, rehabilitation remains a penological theory that the 
Supreme Court allows legislatures to endorse.151 
D. Two post-Graham v. Florida Circuit Court Decisions on                       
§ 841(b)(1)(A) Life-Without-Parole Sentences 
1. United States v. Scott 
Angelo Scott and his two co-conspirators were crack cocaine dealers in 
Iowa City, Iowa.152  After the police uncovered their operation and arrested 
them, federal prosecutors charged Scott with conspiracy to distribute an 
excess of fifty grams of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C § 846.153  The jury 
convicted Scott on this charge, subjecting him to the penalty scheme of § 
841(b)(1)(A).154  At sentencing, the district court found that Scott had two 
                                                          
 145. See id. at 116–18 (describing the evolution of the “rehabilitative ideal” and its 
popularity during the early-twentieth century). 
 146. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
 147. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 144, at 119–24 (summarizing the scholarship 
which reviewed the practice of rehabilitation and concluded that rehabilitative efforts had 
been largely ineffective to that point). 
 148. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 
PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) (italics in original omitted), available at NAT’L AFFAIRS, 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/what-worksquestions-and-answers-
about-prison-reform. 
 149. Compare FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:  PENAL 
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981), as reprinted in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 
127, at 23–30 (detailing the primary modern criticisms of the goal of rehabilitation), with 
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982), as 
reprinted in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 127, at 31–32 (advocating for a return to 
more expansive rehabilitative efforts). 
 150. Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 144, at 119–24. 
 151. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (including rehabilitation as one of the 
four penological goals which the Supreme Court regards as legitimate). 
 152. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1011–12 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 964 (2011). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1012. 
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prior felony drug offense convictions, triggering a mandatory life-without-
parole sentence.155  Significantly, Scott’s first strike was the result of a 
conviction for possessing heroin when he was sixteen-years-old,156 and his 
second strike came at age seventeen when he was convicted for possessing 
crack cocaine.157  Scott appealed on three issues, including the 
constitutionality of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment.158 
Two months after the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed Scott’s conviction and sentence.159  With respect to 
the Eighth Amendment issue, the court held Scott’s sentence was not cruel 
and unusual even though his first two strikes were the result of his actions 
as a juvenile.160  The Eighth Circuit noted that Scott had been charged, 
tried, and convicted as an adult for both of his predicate offenses.161  Even 
if Scott had been convicted as a juvenile, the court explained it would 
nonetheless permit “the use of juvenile court adjudications to enhance 
subsequent sentences for adult convictions.”162 
The Eighth Circuit asserted Graham v. Florida did not affect this 
outcome because Scott was twenty-five-years-old when police arrested him 
for the conspiracy charge that was his third strike.163  According to the 
court, Graham v. Florida was only applicable to “defendants sentenced to 
life in prison without parole for crimes committed as juveniles.”164  The 
Eighth Circuit did not believe Graham v. Florida implicated the 
constitutionality of using prior juvenile convictions to enhance a convicted 
adult’s sentence.165 
                                                          
 155. Id. (clarifying that “[w]hile the prior convictions were under aliases, the district 
court found that the Government proved that the person convicted of each crime was 
actually Scott”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1013. 
 159. Id. at 1018. 
 160. Id.  The Eighth Circuit also rejected Scott’s other Eighth Amendment argument—
that his life-without-parole sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime he 
committed—based on existing circuit precedent.  See id. at 1017–18 (citing United States v. 
Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Whiting, 528 F.3d 595, 597 
(8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Whitehead, 487 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (8th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 679–80 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 161. Id. at 1018. 
 162. Id. (citing United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
 163. Id.  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Scott’s argument based on Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), characterizing Roper as reaching no further than 
“address[ing] the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for a murder committed by 
a juvenile.”  United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.; accord United States v. Cole-Jackson, No. 10-6156, 2011 WL 310518, at *3 
(10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2011) (announcing that “this court has no doubt it is proper under the 
Eighth Amendment to consider adult criminal convictions, even though the defendant was 
under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime, in arriving at an 
appropriate sentence for a recidivist offender who continues to commit crimes into 
adulthood”). 
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2. United States v. Graham 
Donald Graham was also a crack cocaine dealer.166  Police arrested 
Graham as part of a drug investigation in northern Kentucky, and federal 
prosecutors charged him with a multiple-count indictment for crack cocaine 
offenses.167  After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Graham of, among 
other things, conspiracy to distribute an excess of fifty grams of crack 
cocaine.168  At sentencing, the district court found Graham was on his third 
strike, having two prior felony drug offense convictions.169  Graham’s first 
strike was the result of a guilty plea to aggravated drug trafficking when he 
was seventeen-years-old, and his second strike was for a cocaine trafficking 
conviction when he was nineteen-years-old.170  Consequently, the district 
court sentenced Graham to the mandatory term of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole under § 841(b)(1)(A).171  Graham then 
appealed his sentence.172 
In United States v. Graham, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Donald Graham’s 
sentence four months after the Supreme Court ruled in Graham v. 
Florida.173  With regard to his Eighth Amendment challenge, the Sixth 
Circuit stressed that Graham was convicted and sentenced as an adult for 
his first predicate offense even though he was younger than eighteen-years-
old at that time.174  Unlike the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Scott, 
though, the Sixth Circuit “decline[d] to express any opinion on whether a 
juvenile-delinquency adjudication should qualify as a ‘felony drug offense’ 
for § 841(b)(1)(A) mandatory-minimum purposes.”175  Nevertheless, like 
the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit did not believe Graham v. Florida 
governed because the defendant received mandatory life without parole for 
a conviction when he was an adult.176  Thus, the court held Graham’s 
sentence was not cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.177 
Judge Merritt dissented in United States v. Graham.178  In addition to a 
variety of statutory arguments, Judge Merritt briefly discussed the 
                                                          
 166. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 447 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2962 (2011). 
 167. Id. at 447–48. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 454. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 448. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 465. 
 174. Id. at 454–64. 
 175. Id. at 460. 
 176. Id. at 462. 
 177. Id. at 463–64. 
 178. Id. at 465–70 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
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implications of the recent Graham v. Florida decision.179  He contended 
that “sentencing this nonviolent, 30-year-old petty drug trafficker to life 
imprisonment by using a juvenile conviction as a necessary third strike . . . 
violate[d] the sound principles of penological policy based on the Eighth 
Amendment values recently outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Florida.”180  Although he recognized that the holding in Graham v. Florida 
was “technically speaking, probably not binding,”181 Judge Merritt opined 
that Graham v. Florida “should at least make our court and the court 
system more sensitive to the important distinction between juvenile and 
adult criminal conduct.”182 
II. LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE UNDER § 841(b)(1)(A) DUE TO JUVENILE-AGE 
STRIKES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BASED ON GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
Based on the analytical framework of Graham v. Florida, using juvenile-
age prior convictions to trigger life without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A) 
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  Graham v. Florida’s 
first step, examining the objective indicia of how society views this 
sentencing practice, demonstrates the lack of a national consensus on this 
issue.183  This sentencing practice is unconstitutional, however, based on 
Graham v. Florida’s second step.  Defendants who are sentenced to life 
without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A) due to juvenile-age strikes are not 
sufficiently culpable to deserve this sentence, the second-harshest 
punishment in the American criminal justice system.184  Moreover, no 
legitimate penological goal adequately justifies life without parole for these 
defendants.185  Finally, as in Graham v. Florida, international norms 
regarding juvenile criminal conduct and drug offenses support the 
conclusion that § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole for defendants with 
juvenile-age strikes is cruel and unusual.186 
As a result, Angelo Scott should have been subject to a ten-year 
mandatory minimum because his two prior “felony drug offense” 
convictions occurred when he was under eighteen-years-old.187  Likewise, 
Donald Graham should have been subject to a twenty-year mandatory 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 465. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 470. 
 182. Id. at 469. 
 183. Infra Part II.A. 
 184. Infra Part II.B.1. 
 185. Infra Part II.B.2. 
 186. Infra Part II.C. 
 187. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
964 (2011). 
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minimum because his first prior “felony drug offense” conviction occurred 
when he was a juvenile.188 
A. Objective Indicia Show the United States Lacks a Clear Societal 
Consensus Regarding this Sentencing Practice 
Examining the objective indicia of how American society views this 
sentencing practice, as Graham v. Florida did,189 reveals the absence of a 
national consensus because the nation’s jurisdictions vary widely in how 
they treat criminal defendants under eighteen-years-old.  Atkins insisted 
that “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”190  Yet it is 
nearly impossible to simply examine legislation for a definitive conclusion 
in this instance.  For example, sometimes the defendant’s age automatically 
determines whether an adult criminal court or the juvenile adjudicatory 
system will process him.191  Other times, however, prosecutors have 
discretion concerning how to charge a defendant.192  Also, some 
jurisdictions only allow juvenile-age defendants to be charged in the adult 
system when they have committed certain enumerated crimes.193  These 
differences illustrate the complexity inherent in attempting to find a 
national consensus regarding this sentencing practice.194 
Though an imperfect analogy, the manner in which jurisdictions treat 
adult defendants with criminal histories in the juvenile system can be 
informative.  Currently, almost every American jurisdiction has at least one 
                                                          
 188. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2962 (2011). 
 189. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (detailing Graham v. Florida’s first 
step of analysis). 
 190. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 191. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (2011) (mandating that the defendant be at least 
fifteen-years-old to be prosecuted in the adult criminal system, with one exception of no 
minimum age requirement for the crime of possessing a firearm within one-thousand feet of 
a school or day care center); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.110 (2011) (allowing juveniles to be 
prosecuted in adult court only if they are at least sixteen-years-old). 
 192. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)–(2) (2010) (providing a detailed, complicated set 
of criteria for either discretionary or mandatory filing of an information); Paul Duggan, 
Juvenile Charged in D.C. Shootings Can’t be Tried as Adult, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2010, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/crime-scene/paul-duggan/juvenile-charged-in-dc-
shootin.html (noting how the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C. “has the 
discretion to prosecute a 16- or 17-year-old suspect as an adult if the youth is charged with 
murder, armed robbery, rape, or first-degree burglary”). 
 193. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-134 (2010) (permitting defendants under 
sixteen-years-old to be prosecuted in adult criminal court if charged with “first degree 
murder, second degree murder, rape, aggravated rape, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a 
child, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated 
kidnapping or especially aggravated kidnapping or an attempt to commit any such 
offenses”). 
 194. See also Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1940, 1953–54 (2010) (discussing further variables that complicate this issue). 
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juvenile court statute allowing juvenile records to be used at sentencing in 
adult criminal court.195  In addition, many jurisdictions have various 
criminal court provisions, such as sentencing statutes, guidelines, and 
presentence reports, which authorize the use of juvenile records at 
sentencing.196 
Even though this plethora of statutory provisions demonstrates that 
American society favors enhanced sentences because of prior juvenile 
adjudications, Graham v. Florida establishes that the jurisdictions’ actual 
sentencing practices are crucial.197  Thus, the real question is how juvenile 
adjudications actually affect adult sentencing in practice.  On this point, 
appellate courts in nineteen jurisdictions have allowed juvenile 
adjudications to have an outright recidivist impact, meaning the specific 
number of years added to the sentence because of juvenile adjudications 
can be calculated.198  These jurisdictions principally reasoned that true first-
time adult offenders need to be separated from adult defendants with 
juvenile criminal records.199  Of these nineteen jurisdictions, only three 
explicitly permit juvenile adjudications to count as strikes for purposes of 
                                                          
 195. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Striking Out on the First Pitch in Criminal Court, 1 
BARRY L. REV. 7, 18–20 tbl.2 (2000) (listing forty-five jurisdictions with explicit juvenile 
court laws to this effect). 
 196. See id. (listing thirty-five jurisdictions that have criminal court provisions allowing 
for the use of juvenile adjudications at sentencing in criminal court). 
 197. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–27 (2010) (exploring actual 
sentencing practices in jurisdictions that had legislation allowing the sentence at issue); 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 544 U.S. 407, 433 (2008) (same). 
 198. See United States v. Torres, 217 F. App’x 540, 543 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing 
juvenile adjudications to be considered to some extent for purposes of determining 
recidivism); Andrews v. State, 967 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (same); People 
v. Davis, 938 P.2d 938, 940–42 (Cal. 1997) (same); People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1271 
(Colo. 1984) (en banc) (same); Williams v. State, 994 So. 2d 337, 339–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008) (same); People v. Forrest, 595 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same); 
Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 806 (Ind. 1998) (same); State v. Haskins, 942 P.2d 16, 
19 (Kan. 1997) (same); State v. Tucker, 354 So. 2d 521, 524–25 (La. 1978) (same); People 
v. Smith, 470 N.W.2d 70, 74–75 (Mich. 1991) (same); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 
614–15 (Minn. 2006) (same); State v. Bieniek, 985 A.2d 1251, 1256 (N.J. 2010) (per 
curiam) (same); State v. Wiley, 565 S.E.2d 22, 44–46 (N.C. 2002) (same); State v. Stewart, 
892 P.2d 1013, 1016–17 (Or. 1995) (same); Commonwealth v. Myers, 536 A.2d 428, 429–
30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (same); State v. Jackson, 60 S.W.3d 738, 741–43 (Tenn. 2001) 
(same); Lindsay v. State, 102 S.W.3d 223, 226–27 (Tex. App. 2003) (same); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 165, 171–72 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (same); State v. McAlpin, 
740 P.2d 824, 826–27 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (same). 
 199. See, e.g., Smith, 470 N.W.2d at 75 (stating that “[t]he law contemplates a 
differentiation in sentencing between first-time offenders and recidivists, juvenile or adult”); 
State v. Peterson, 331 N.W.2d 483, 484 (Minn. 1983) (en banc) (“The juvenile history item 
is included in the criminal history index to identify those young adult felons whose criminal 
careers were preceded by repeated felony-type offenses committed as a juvenile.” (citation 
omitted)); Commonwealth v. Krum, 533 A.2d 134, 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (concluding 
that “a child who continues his pattern of serious and violent anti-social activity into 
adulthood should not receive the benefit of a cloak of immunity regarding that behavior” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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their three strikes laws.200  At the other end of the spectrum, two states 
categorically forbid judges from using juvenile adjudications to enhance an 
adult sentence.201 
In the majority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, “it is impossible to 
determine the precise impact juvenile records can or will have on criminal 
court sentencing.”202  A history in the juvenile justice system can matter in 
these jurisdictions, but juvenile adjudications seem to be one flexible factor 
among many others when sentencing the defendant, thus promoting the 
idea of sentencing on an individualized basis.203  In the end, the mixed-bag 
of jurisdictions’ policies and practices on using juvenile-age convictions for 
recidivism purposes demonstrates the lack of a national consensus 
regarding this particular sentencing regime. 
B. Life Without Parole Under § 841(b)(1)(A) is Too Severe for These 
Offenders Because of Their Diminished Culpability and Because this 
Sentence Lacks a Sufficient Penological Justification 
Although the United States lacks a national consensus on how to treat 
juvenile-age convictions when sentencing adult offenders, the second step 
of Graham v. Florida’s analysis shows this sentencing practice is cruel and 
unusual.  At the second step in Graham v. Florida, the Court exercised its 
“independent judgment” to conclude life without parole was 
disproportionate for juvenile defendants convicted of nonhomicide crimes 
and would not serve any legitimate penological goal.204  Likewise, under 
the Graham v. Florida framework, sentencing defendants like Angelo Scott 
and Donald Graham to § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole is 
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
                                                          
 200. See Davis, 938 P.2d at 940–42 (California Supreme Court allowing juvenile 
adjudications to count as strikes under the state’s three strikes law); Williams, 994 So. 2d at 
339–40 (Florida District Court of Appeals permitting juvenile adjudication to be a strike); 
Lindsay, 102 S.W.3d at 226–27 (Texas Court of Appeals letting juvenile adjudication count 
as a strike).  But see Vanesch v. State, 37 S.W.3d 196, 200–01 (Ark. 2001) (disallowing 
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses for state’s three strikes law); Fletcher v. State, 
409 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Del. 1979) (same); Paige v. Gaffney, 483 P.2d 494, 495 (Kan. 1971) 
(same); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1288–90 (La. 2004) (same); Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (same); State v. Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 490, 
492 (S.C. 2001) (same); State v. Maxey, 663 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (same). 
 201. See Sanborn, supra note 195, at 21 (noting how Arizona and Georgia “clearly 
prevent juvenile adjudications from enhancing criminal court sentences”). 
 202. See id. (contending that, in twenty-six jurisdictions, “the exact difference juvenile 
records will have in this context is immeasurable”). 
 203. Id. (explaining that a defendant’s sentence can be influenced by prior offenses, “but 
no definitive impact [of prior offenses] has been allotted”). 
 204. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010). 
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1. Life without parole is unduly severe in light of the lessened culpability
 of this class of offenders 
The second step in Graham v. Florida initially compared the gravity of 
the sentence with the culpability of the defendants.205  As in Graham v. 
Florida, life without parole—the second-most severe punishment permitted 
by the American criminal justice system206—is too harsh for defendants 
like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham.  Because they were nonviolent drug 
traffickers with juvenile-age strikes, these defendants had diminished 
culpability.  This punishment is unconstitutionally excessive for them. 
Life without parole is a drastic sentence.  Even though the death penalty 
is “unique in its severity and irrevocability,”207 the Supreme Court has 
recognized that life without parole is similar to the death penalty in 
important respects.208  A sentence of life without parole “alters the 
offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable” because it “deprives the 
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”209  
Although a prisoner can potentially obtain relief through executive 
clemency, such a remote possibility does not overcome the severity of this 
sentence.210 
The Nevada Supreme Court illustrated the exceptional nature of life 
without parole in declaring: 
All but the deadliest and most unsalvageable of prisoners have the right 
to appear before the board of parole to try and show that they have 
behaved well in prison confines and that their moral and spiritual 
betterment merits consideration of some adjustment of their sentences.  
Denial of this vital opportunity means denial of hope; it means that good 
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that 
whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the 
prisoner], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.211 
The Ninth Circuit recently echoed these sentiments, noting that a life 
without parole sentence “condemn[s] [the prisoner] to die in a living tomb, 
there to linger out what may be a long life . . . without any of its alleviation 
                                                          
 205. Id. at 2026–28. 
 206. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) 
(acknowledging that life without parole “is itself a severe sanction”). 
 207. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
 208. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (asserting that “life without parole 
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other 
sentences”). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)); accord Naovarath v. 
State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 n.1 (Nev. 1989) (“We suppose that in light of this remote 
possibility Dante’s fancied inscription on the gates of hell, ‘Abandon Hope All Ye Who 
Enter Here,’ may not be properly fastened above [the prisoner’s] cell; nevertheless, for now, 
the sentence is unequivocal:  life imprisonment, without parole—life ends in prison.”). 
 211. Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 944 (emphasis added). 
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or rewards—debarred from all pleasant sights and sounds, and cut off from 
all earthly hope.”212  Since life without parole is so harsh, only severely-
culpable criminals deserve this punishment.213 
Defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham are not such severely-
culpable criminals.  The culpability of a class of offenders is partly 
determined by the offenders’ characteristics.214  One of these defendants’ 
chief characteristics is that they were juveniles when they committed at 
least one of their predicate offenses.215  The Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that juvenile crime is not as morally-offensive as adult criminal 
conduct.216  As Roper demonstrated and Graham v. Florida reaffirmed, this 
lesser moral blameworthiness is based on scientific conclusions that the 
juvenile brain is still developing.217  In light of these physiological 
circumstances, the Supreme Court has understood that “youth is more than 
a chronological fact”—it is a distinct “time and condition of life.”218  
Juveniles are often immature, irresponsible, more vulnerable to negative 
pressures in their environment, and, frequently, they do not fully consider 
the consequences of their actions.219  The Eighth and Sixth Circuits 
recognized that Angelo Scott and Donald Graham were adults when they 
were sentenced to § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole,220 yet their prior 
convictions that triggered these mandatory sentences were committed while 
they were juveniles and thus were the product of these characteristics.221 
Further, the Eighth and Sixth Circuits were wrong to rely on the fact that 
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham were charged, tried, and convicted as 
                                                          
 212. Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 213. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–28 (analyzing the severity of life 
without parole and concluding juvenile nonhomicide offenders are not culpable enough to 
deserve this sentence). 
 214. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that culpability is measured 
by (1) the offenders’ characteristics and (2) the crimes they committed). 
 215. See supra notes 156–157, 170 and accompanying text (detailing the defendants’ 
earlier strikes for purposes of § 841(b)). 
 216. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 
(2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 217. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (citing various amici and other 
scientific authorities); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–76 (same). 
 218. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). 
 219. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; accord Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) 
(plurality opinion) (observing that juveniles “often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”). 
 220. See supra notes 165, 176 and accompanying text (providing the circuit courts’ 
reasoning). 
 221. Cf. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402–06 (2011) (detailing why 
“children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults” and thus holding that a child’s age 
properly informs the custody analysis under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (covering those characteristics of juveniles that 
make them a unique class of defendants); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71 (noting juveniles’ 
distinctive features). 
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adults for their predicate offenses.222  Indeed, the juvenile defendants in 
both Roper and Graham v. Florida had also been charged, tried, and 
convicted as adults.223  In both cases, however, the Supreme Court 
invalidated those sentences and fashioned categorical rules for defendants 
under eighteen-years-old because of the inherent differences between 
adults and juveniles.224  Regardless of whether they were prosecuted as 
adults, defendants who were juveniles at the time of their predicate 
offenses are less culpable than defendants whose three strikes were entirely 
the product of their adult criminal conduct. 
A defendant’s culpability also depends on the nature of the crime he 
committed.225  Angelo Scott and Donald Graham had diminished 
culpability because they committed nonviolent offenses.226  In a seminal 
Eighth Amendment case, the Supreme Court asserted that nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than violent or threatening crimes.227  Defendants 
falling within the purview of § 841(b)(1)(A) deserve significant 
punishment.  But nonviolent drug traffickers should not be classified 
among the second-worst offenders in the American criminal justice 
system.228  The defendant in Kennedy heinously raped his eight-year-old 
stepdaughter, yet the Supreme Court held the maximum sentence he could 
                                                          
 222. See supra notes 161, 174 and accompanying text (referring to the circuit courts’ 
emphasis on Angelo Scott and Donald Graham having been prosecuted in the adult criminal 
system for their prior convictions). 
 223. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2018 (“Graham’s prosecutor elected to charge 
Graham as an adult.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[Simmons] was tried as an adult.”). 
 224. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71. 
 225. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that culpability is determined by 
both (1) the offender’s characteristics and (2) the type of crime he committed). 
 226. See J. Richard Broughton, Kennedy and the Tail of Minos, 69 LA. L. REV. 593, 625 
(2009) (“Indeed, there is a compelling argument to be made that where the crimes involved 
are nonviolent and result in minimal harm, courts ought to be more robust in reviewing 
facially harsh sentences and in enforcing limits on political actors.”); see also Paul Butler, 
Racially Based Jury Nullification:  Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE 
L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (urging juries to acquit nonviolent drug offenders, especially black 
offenders in urban locations); Ed Burns et al., Saving Cities, and Souls, TIME, Mar. 17, 
2008, at 50 (supporting petit grand jury nullification when prosecutors try to charge 
nonviolent drug offenders). 
 227. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983) (noting that criminal laws are more 
protective of people than property); accord BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996) 
(recognizing “the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others,” such 
as violent versus nonviolent crimes).  The idea that crimes of violence should be punished 
more severely than nonviolent crimes is expressed throughout American criminal law 
doctrines, such as the limitations that legislatures and courts place on the felony-murder 
rule.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2010) (enumerating specific violent felonies, 
like torture, rape, arson, and kidnapping, that a defendant must commit to be subject to first 
degree felony-murder); People v. Howard, 104 P.3d 107, 110–11 (Cal. 2005) (articulating 
that a defendant must commit a felony “inherently dangerous to human life” to qualify for 
second degree felony-murder (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Robinson et al., 
supra note 194, at 1959 n.73 (listing forty jurisdictions that only allow inherently dangerous 
felonies to trigger the felony-murder rule). 
 228. See supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text (explaining that life without parole 
is the second-harshest punishment in the United States and thus is extremely severe). 
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receive was life without parole.229  Even defendants involved in the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and al Qaeda’s war against the United States 
have only been sentenced to life without parole.230  Nonviolent drug 
traffickers are not as morally reprehensible as violent criminals who truly 
deserve life without parole.231  Just as the Graham v. Florida Court 
concluded that life without parole was categorically disproportionate for 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders,232 Angelo Scott and Donald Graham were 
not sufficiently culpable to warrant mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life without 
parole due to their prior juvenile-age convictions.  Their sentences were 
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
2. No legitimate penological goal adequately justifies counting juvenile-
 age convictions as strikes 
The second analytical step in Graham v. Florida next required the Court 
to consider potential penological justifications for the sentence.233  A 
sentence is unconstitutional if it does not sufficiently further any of the four 
accepted goals of punishment:  retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.234  The government must show more than some marginal 
promotion of a penological goal; each penological justification is limited 
by the principle that the punishment must not be “grossly disproportionate 
in light of the justification offered.”235  As demonstrated below, none of 
these four penological theories adequately justifies § 841(b)(1)(A) life 
without parole for a defendant who is on his third strike due to juvenile-age 
predicate offenses. 
                                                          
 229. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412–15, 438 (2008). 
 230. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 410 F. App’x 673, 675 (4th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (affirming a life sentence for Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, who was affiliated with an al 
Qaeda cell in Saudi Arabia and planned to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States); 
United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 307 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding Zacarias 
Moussaoui’s life without parole sentence after he pled guilty to conspiracy charges 
connected to the September 11 attacks). 
 231. See United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 250, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
a drug offender must not have used violence or the threat of violence in connection with his 
offense to be eligible for the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety valve, which pardons a defendant 
from the mandatory minimum); United States v. Byers, No. 3:00-CR-137-6-FDW, 2008 WL 
7994962, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 2008) (stating that typical, nonviolent crack cocaine 
offenders are less culpable than the defendant, who had “participated in an extremely violent 
drug conspiracy and was himself an accessory to felony murder”); United States v. Cherry, 
366 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376 (E.D. Va. 2005) (recognizing that the defendant qualified for the § 
3553(f) safety valve, in part, because she “did not use any violence, threats of violence, a 
firearm, or any other dangerous weapon, nor did she encourage anyone else to do so”). 
 232. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030–33 (2010). 
 233. Id. at 2028. 
 234. See id. (declaring that a “sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is 
by its nature disproportionate to the offense”). 
 235. Id. at 2029. 
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a. Retribution 
The goal of retribution, whether adopting a harm-based retributivist or an 
intent-based retributivist approach, does not support the use of juvenile-age 
convictions to reach life without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A).  The 
Supreme Court does not normally endorse harm-based retributivism,236 yet 
harm-based retributivists argue that drug traffickers deserve harsh 
punishment because of the potential far-reaching consequences of their 
illegal activities.237  But drug trafficking is neither a crime against the 
person nor, by definition, a violent offense.238  The only criterion for a 
defendant to fall within the purview of § 841(b)(1)(A) is the quantity of 
drugs he trafficked.239  Although drug quantity can potentially relate to the 
amount of harm a drug trafficker causes, only the specific facts of a case 
can accurately demonstrate the defendant’s culpability.240 
Nor does intent-based retributivism, based exclusively on the personal 
                                                          
 236. See supra notes 118, 120–122 and accompanying text (defining harm-based 
retributivism and the rarity of the Supreme Court adopting this theory). 
 237. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., SPEAKING OUT AGAINST DRUG LEGALIZATION 
50–53 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/demand/speakout/speak_out_ 
101210.pdf (asserting that “[d]rug use, crime, and violence go hand-in-hand”); see also 
Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1178–79 
(2004) (noting that modern prosecutors regularly “justify their aggressive prosecutions of 
narcotics traffickers on the ground that drug traffickers are likely to engage in violence” and 
that prosecutors think “drug dealing has a complementary relationship to violence, and even 
if drug dealing is not a terrible evil, punishing that dealing can avert greater harm to society” 
(citation omitted)). 
 238. See United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing that many drug trafficking crimes are “victimless” and thus do not 
warrant a severe prison sentence); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 
1997) (distinguishing between the crime of distributing child pornography, where a victim is 
directly harmed, and the crimes of “drug and immigration offenses,” which do not have a 
concrete victim); Llach v. United States, 739 F.2d 1322, 1333 (8th Cir. 1984) (referring to 
the drug trafficking charge against the defendant as a “victimless crime”); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt. 2 (2010) (giving the examples of “drug [and] 
immigration offenses” as “offenses in which there are no identifiable victims”).  But see 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (arguing that trying to label the massive quantity of drug trafficking 
in this case a “victimless” crime was “false to the point of absurdity”). 
 239. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (failing to provide any factor other than 
quantities of drugs as placing a defendant within this subsection). 
 240. See, e.g., United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2009) (stressing that 
“particular drug offenders present varying degrees of risk to the community depending upon 
the circumstances”); United States v. Moore, 212 F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Merely 
purchasing drugs from someone for resale does not demonstrate that the sale of all drugs 
remaining in the seller’s possession is an activity undertaken between the seller and the 
buyer.”); United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing the district 
court’s sentence because the government had not proven whether the defendant could have 
reasonably foreseen his codefendant’s larger drug trafficking operations); United States v. 
Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1517 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that one of the small-scale defendants 
in a drug ring could not be sentenced to the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute 
at least fifty grams of crack cocaine because his co-conspirator’s massive sales were not 
reasonably foreseeable). 
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culpability of the offender,241 justify this sentencing practice.242  As 
explained above, defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham have 
diminished culpability for two reasons.  First, they were juveniles at the 
time of at least one of their underlying offenses.243  Second, they were 
convicted of nonviolent drug trafficking charges, so they should not be 
classified among the second-worst class of criminal defendants.244  Thus, 
mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole for these offenders is not 
warranted under either a harm-based or intent-based retributivist theory. 
b. General deterrence 
The penological goal of general deterrence does not legitimize using 
juvenile-age convictions as strikes to reach a § 841(b)(1)(A) life-without-
parole sentence.  Three strikes laws and other recidivism-based sentencing 
schemes may further general deterrence to some extent.245  Still, life 
without parole is unconstitutional here because of this rationale’s limits as 
applied to defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham. 
Many studies conclude a justice system that increases the severity of 
penalties is less effective than a justice system that increases the chances of 
detection and conviction.246  As economist Steven E. Landsburg explains, 
“[f]or the most part, criminals prefer a small chance of a big punishment to 
a big chance of a small punishment.”247  This preference stems from the 
fact that criminals are typically risk-loving people.248  Most scholarship, 
therefore, “point[s] to large deterrent effects emanating from increased 
certainty of punishment, and much smaller, and generally insignificant, 
                                                          
 241. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text (explaining intent-based 
retributivism). 
 242. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes:  Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 395, 427 (1997) (asserting that all “[h]abitual offender statutes are not 
retributive” because the term of imprisonment is “imposed without regard to the culpability 
of the offender”). 
 243. See supra notes 216–223 and accompanying text (arguing that defendants like 
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham have diminished culpability based on their juvenile-age 
convictions because juvenile crime is not as morally reprehensible as similar adult crime). 
 244. See supra notes 226–231 and accompanying text (claiming nonviolent drug 
traffickers have lesser culpability than violent criminals). 
 245. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 10 (1970) (characterizing § 841(b)’s 
sentencing scheme as a “deterrent to those who otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit 
traffic”). 
 246. E.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR., 
MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES:  THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ 
MONEY? 75 (1997); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. 
INQUIRY 297, 297, 308 (1991). 
 247. Steven E. Landsburg, Does Crime Pay?, SLATE (Dec. 9, 1999, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/57573. 
 248. See id. (contrasting people who prefer a big chance of a small punishment, such as 
those who go into “punishing careers” like construction work or coal mining, with 
criminals, who prefer a small chance of big punishment). 
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effects stemming from increased severity of sanction.”249  As a theory, 
general deterrence only justifies punishment to a certain degree.250  Thus, a 
system that imposes drastic penalties for recidivism should be viewed as 
inherently less credible than a system that more frequently detects and 
punishes criminal conduct. 
Because the current criminal justice system focuses on harsh 
punishments instead of increased detection and conviction, particularly for 
drug offenses, significant questions remain about the rationale of general 
deterrence as applied to drug traffickers.251  Drug traffickers “probably do 
calculate the risks and rewards [of their crimes] in a fairly sophisticated 
way.”252  And the American law enforcement system does not detect and 
convict drug traffickers to nearly the same extent as other types of 
criminals.253  Therefore, the cost-benefit analysis favors criminals who 
traffic drugs.254  Consequently, as Professor Leipold concluded, “if 
deterrence of drug use through the criminal law is our goal, we appear to be 
tinkering at the margins” instead of attacking the heart of the problem by 
increasing detection and conviction rates.255 
Moreover, the rationale of general deterrence can never fully apply to 
juvenile criminal conduct.  As the Roper Court observed, “the same 
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as 
well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”256  Simply put, 
juveniles often fail to recognize many consequences of their actions.257  As 
a result, a defendant with juvenile-age strikes should not be subject to the 
same level of punishment as a defendant whose entire criminal career was 
                                                          
 249. Grogger, supra note 246, at 308; accord Landsburg, supra note 247 (claiming “if 
you want to make crime less attractive to criminals, it’s better to double the odds of 
conviction than to double the severity of the punishment”). 
 250. See Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
1071, 1076 (1964) (suggesting that it would be inappropriate to rely on general deterrence 
too heavily because “boiling people in oil [for] a slow and painful death may be thought 
more of a deterrent to crime than a quick and painless one”). 
 251. See generally Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence, 
6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 111, 112–22 (2002) (exploring why deterrence has failed in the 
war on drugs). 
 252. Id. at 115. 
 253. See id. at 120–21 (examining “clearance rate” statistics, which show “the 
percentage of crimes committed that result in an arrest and the filing of criminal charges,” 
for various crimes). 
 254. See id. at 115 (observing “that there seems to be no end to the rational (if immoral) 
[drug traffickers] who are willing to give it a try” (citation omitted)). 
 255. Id. at 121 (“More pointedly, if we want to get a deterrence effect in [drug] crimes 
comparable to other offenses, we have to escalate the drug war considerably.”). 
 256. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 257. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–29 (2010) (analyzing why deterrence 
did not serve as an adequate theory to support the sentencing practice at issue); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“The likelihood that the teenage 
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the 
possibility of [severe punishment] is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”). 
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the product of his adult decisions because general deterrence affects each of 
these individuals differently.  For these reasons, the penological theory of 
general deterrence does not adequately justify § 841(b)(1)(A) life without 
parole due to juvenile-age strikes. 
c. Specific deterrence and incapacitation 
Although specific deterrence and incapacitation are often the main 
rationales cited by proponents of recidivist sentencing schemes,258 these 
theories do not validate § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole for defendants 
with juvenile-age strikes.  These two concepts are best analyzed together 
because both are based on the justice system’s ability to accurately predict 
who is likely to engage in future criminal activity. 
Before evaluating the faults of specific deterrence and incapacitation as 
applied to defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham, it is worth 
noting that imprisonment—for any length of time—is an imperfect means 
of implementing these penological goals.  Crime does not stop at the 
jailhouse doors.259  Gangs are present and growing throughout the 
American penal system,260 and prisons are the sites of a great deal of illegal 
activity.261  Thus, incarcerating criminals does not completely stop them 
from committing more crimes; imprisonment only prevents some crimes 
from happening outside of jail. 
Even if the goal is to deter and incapacitate ex-convicts so they do not 
commit crimes within the general population, these penological theories are 
of limited use for defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham.  To 
sufficiently justify life without parole with these two rationales, the 
criminal justice system would have to accurately predict who will pose a 
                                                          
 258. In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the Court observed, “a recidivist 
statute[’s] . . . primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of 
one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to 
segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time.”  Id. at 27 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (arguing that 
“[s]tates have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals”); Robinson et 
al., supra note 194, at 1950 (reiterating that “[t]he underlying rationale for [habitual 
offender] statutes is typically incapacitative” (citation omitted)). 
 259. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301–05 (1995) (providing the underlying 
facts of the case, which were that a black inmate had been stabbed to death in the Missouri 
State Penitentiary); Ryan, supra note 120, at 110 n.154 (citing statistics about the number of 
homicides that occurred in state prisons from 2001–2006). 
 260. See generally Geoffrey Hunt et al., Changes in Prison Culture:  Prison Gangs & 
the Case of the “Pepsi Generation,” 40 SOC. PROBS. 398, 398–409 (1993) (studying 
California prison gangs and noting that “although all five of the older gangs still exist . . . a 
new crop of gangs has taken center stage”). 
 261. See, e.g., VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:  LIVING AND DYING IN PRISON 
TODAY 33–39 (Robert Johnson & Sonia Tabriz eds., 5th ed. 2011) (describing the realities 
of life in jail, including prison subcultures and the regularity of in-prison violence); id. at 
80–84 (providing details about different types of prison rape). 
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continuing threat to society.262  As the Graham v. Florida Court declared, 
“[t]o justify life without parole on the assumption that the [defendant] 
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a 
judgment that the [defendant] is incorrigible.”263  As one state court aptly 
stated, however, “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”264  Since a 
juvenile’s character is more malleable than that of an adult and his 
“personality traits . . . are more transitory [and] less fixed [than those of an 
adult],”265 juvenile criminal conduct is not necessarily indicative of how an 
offender will behave in the future.  Likewise, defendants with prior 
juvenile-age convictions who are subject to the sentencing scheme of § 
841(b)(1)(A) cannot be definitively categorized as posing a perpetual 
danger to society.266 
In addition, these two penological goals do not wholly apply to 
defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham because of the nature of 
their crimes.  According to government-conducted studies, nonviolent drug 
traffickers have one of the lowest recidivism rates of any class of 
offenders.267  Although a defendant on his third strike can already be 
thought of as a recidivist to some extent, only the particular facts of his 
case can reveal whether he is a true drug trafficking recidivist or if his 
strikes were the result of other, less severe drug offenses that fit within § 
841(b)(1)(A)’s expansive definition of “felony drug offense.”268  With such 
uncertainty in accurately predicting these defendants’ potential for future 
                                                          
 262. See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (examining the implications of 
specific deterrence and incapacitation as penological theories). 
 263. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010). 
 264. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968); accord Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (insisting that “[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption”). 
 265. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citing ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY:  YOUTH AND CRISIS 
(1968)).  The Roper Court elaborated from this point, stating that “[f]rom a moral standpoint 
it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater 
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”  Id. 
 266. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (commanding that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause “forbid[s] States from making the judgment at the outset that [juvenile 
nonhomicide] offenders never will be fit to reenter society”). 
 267. See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM:  THE CRIMINAL 
HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 13 (2004) (observing that 
drug trafficking offenders are within the group of offenders that “are overall the least likely 
to recidivate”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFENDERS 
RETURNING TO FEDERAL PRISON, 1986-97, at 1, 3 (2000) (observing that drug offenders had 
a lower recidivism rate than property and public-order offenders)). 
 268. Compare United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010) (revealing that 
the defendant’s first two strikes were only convictions for drug possession charges), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 964 (2011), with United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 
2010) (showing how the defendant’s first two strikes were related to previous instances of 
drug trafficking), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2962 (2011). 
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crime, specific deterrence and incapacitation fail to sufficiently justify § 
841(b)(1)(A) life without parole. 
d. Rehabilitation 
The penological goal of rehabilitation cannot justify life without parole 
under § 841(b)(1)(A) due to juvenile-age strikes.  Through rehabilitation, 
the state seeks to reform and improve a criminal’s character so he can 
become a productive member of society.269  In Graham v. Florida, the 
Court stated why the theory of rehabilitation can never justify life without 
parole:  “The penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal 
[because] . . . the [government] makes an irrevocable judgment about that 
person’s value and place in society.”270  Further, beyond “expressive 
judgment” about the individual’s worth, a life without parole sentence 
carries practical consequences for the convict when in prison.271  For 
example, states often refuse access to educational and vocational training 
programs for inmates sentenced to life without parole.272  For these reasons, 
life without parole is inherently contrary to the goal of rehabilitation. 
C. International Standards Relating to Juvenile Criminal Conduct and 
Drug Trafficking Offenses Confirm this Sentencing Practice Is Cruel and 
Unusual 
Just as international sources supported Graham v. Florida’s holding,273 
international norms also show that using juvenile-age convictions as strikes 
under § 841(b)(1)(A) is cruel and unusual.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly looked beyond the United States’ borders in Eighth Amendment 
cases.274  While international standards are not controlling,275 the Court has 
                                                          
 269. See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text (defining rehabilitation). 
 270. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30; accord Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 1028 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that since “a mandatory sentence of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole . . . [means] [t]he offender will never 
regain his freedom,” the punishment “does not even purport to serve a rehabilitative 
function”). 
 271. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 272. See id. (citing Brief of the Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 11–13, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) & Sullivan v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-7621)). 
 273. See id. at 2033 (emphasizing that the Court’s conclusion was supported by the fact 
that “the world over” rejected sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without 
parole). 
 274. See id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) 
(plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 & n.22 (1982) (plurality 
opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality opinion)).  But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 739–51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(criticizing the practice of using foreign legal sources when interpreting the United States 
Constitution). 
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recognized “‘the climate of international opinion concerning the 
acceptability of a particular punishment’ is an additional consideration 
which is ‘not irrelevant.’”276  Thus, this portion of the analysis does not 
turn on the mandatory or permissive nature of the United States’ 
international obligations; international standards merely inform Eighth 
Amendment values. 
Even though most American defendants, like Angelo Scott and Donald 
Graham, are adults when they are subject to mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life 
without parole, well-recognized principles of international human rights 
law should generate concern about the ramifications of using juvenile-age 
convictions to reach that sentence.277  The international community is often 
more sensitive to the consequences of juvenile crime, demonstrated by the 
United States standing as the world’s only nation with a functioning 
government that is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.278  Article 37(a) of this Convention provides, in part, 
“life imprisonment without possibility of release shall [not] be imposed for 
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”279  Further, 
Article 40(1) of this Convention directly advances a rehabilitative theory 
by stressing that juveniles should “be treated in a manner consistent 
with . . . promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a 
constructive role in society.”280  As Amnesty International has noted, 
“[m]ost [foreign] governments either have expressly prohibited, never 
allowed, or do not impose [life without parole] sentences on child 
offenders, because it violates the principles of child development and 
                                                          
 275. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (“The judgments of other nations and the 
international community are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 276. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10). 
 277. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 
40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985). 
 278. See Brief for Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 15, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) & Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-7621) [hereinafter Amnesty International Brief] (detailing 
how the United States and Somalia, which does not have a functioning government, are the 
only two countries that have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
 279. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 280. Id. art. 40(1); accord United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33, at 212 (Nov. 29, 1985) (“The objective of training and treatment of 
juveniles placed in institutions is to provide care, protection, education and vocations skills, 
with a view to assisting them to assume socially constructive and productive roles in 
society.”).  Various other international sources also highlight the primacy that rehabilitation 
should have whenever any criminal, juvenile or adult, is imprisoned.  See DIRK VAN ZYL 
SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 
(2002) (discussing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution of Spain, and the Constitution of Italy as all 
stressing the importance of rehabilitation). 
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protection established through . . . international human rights law.”281  In 
Germany, for instance, juvenile defendants cannot receive a prison 
sentence over ten years for any crime they commit.282  Thus, using 
juvenile-age convictions as strikes under § 841(b)(1)(A) defies the normal 
international practice of limiting the consequences of juvenile crime. 
Further, many countries do not punish drug offenses as harshly as the 
United States does, supporting the idea that mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life 
without parole due to juvenile-age strikes is cruel and unusual.  In one 
Canadian case, for example, the defendant was convicted of importing 
seven and a half ounces of cocaine, subjecting him to a mandatory 
minimum of seven years imprisonment.283  Interpreting section 12 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which also prohibits “cruel and 
unusual” punishments,284 the Supreme Court of Canada held the statute was 
unlawful.285  In reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated the mandatory 
punishment as it would have applied to the least culpable offender.286  
Significantly, the court overlooked the defendant’s known history of drug 
smuggling and the nature of the imported drug, showing a level of leniency 
atypical in American drug trafficking cases.287  This case demonstrates 
Canada’s commitment to ensuring that only the worst criminal offenders 
receive the worst criminal sentences.288 
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham are not among the worst American 
criminals, and no penological goal adequately justifies life without parole 
for them.289  Declaring their sentences unconstitutional would be consistent 
with international norms. 
                                                          
 281. Amnesty International Brief, supra note 278, at 17 (citing Connie de la Vega & 
Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989–
90 (2008)). 
 282. Id. at 16. 
 283. See R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, paras. 36–38 (Can.) (laying out the facts of 
the case and the statutory provision at issue).  While the mandatory minimum was only 
seven years, the defendant, in fact, had received an eight-year sentence.  Id. paras. 14, 18. 
 284. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 12, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the right not 
to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”). 
 285. See Smith, 1 S.C.R. para. 107. 
 286. As Justice Lamer stated, 
[A] judge who would sentence to seven years in a penitentiary a young person who, 
while driving back into Canada from a winter break in the U.S.A., is caught with 
only one, indeed, let’s postulate, his or her first “joint of grass,” would certainly be 
considered by most Canadians to be a cruel and, all would hope, a very unusual 
judge. 
Id. para. 34. 
 287. See id. paras. 65–69 (evaluating the law at issue in the abstract rather than as 
applied to the particular defendant). 
 288. See id. para. 73 (stating that “[w]e do not need to sentence the small offenders to 
seven years in prison in order to deter the serious offender,” and thus concluding that “the 
net cast by [the statute at issue] for sentencing purposes need not be so wide”). 
 289. See supra Part II.B (arguing that life without parole is unconstitutional, as it is too 
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III. SECTION 3553(a) IS THE PROPER PLACE FOR JUDGES TO CONSIDER A 
DEFENDANT’S JUVENILE CRIMINAL HISTORY 
Although using juvenile-age convictions as strikes under § 841(b)(1)(A) 
to reach life without parole is unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, a 
defendant’s juvenile criminal history need not be completely excluded at 
sentencing.  Regardless of any other sentencing provision related to a 
particular crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 overlays the imposition of all criminal 
sentences.290  Under § 3553, all federal district court judges must first 
calculate the proper Sentencing Guidelines range.291  From that point, the 
judge must consider an appropriate sentence for the defendant in view of 
the factors outlined in § 3553(a).292  Section 3553(a)(1) specifically directs 
the sentencing judge to consider “the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”293  If a defendant has exhibited an elevated pattern of criminal 
conduct and the prosecution has adequately demonstrated that the 
defendant deserves more than the mandatory minimum, the judge can 
sentence him to a longer term.294 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has strived to advance the notion of 
sentencing defendants on an individual basis.295  The landmark 2005 
decision United States v. Booker,296 which held the mandatory nature of the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional,297 dramatically 
illustrates the Court’s willingness to ensure defendants are sentenced as 
individuals.  As the Court has recognized, “[i]t has been uniform and 
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider 
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in 
the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime 
                                                          
severe for these defendants because of their diminished culpability and because it does not 
sufficiently further any legitimate penological goal). 
 290. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
 291. Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 891–92 (2009) (per curiam). 
 292. Id. 
 293. § 3553(a)(1); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f) (providing the means for a defendant’s 
counsel to object to a presentence report based on that defendant’s individual traits). 
 294. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (acknowledging a district court 
judge’s broad discretion in sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) 
(asserting that “the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime”); see also 
Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564 (1984) (advancing the view that considering a 
broad range of evidence about the defendant “ensures that the punishment will suit not 
merely the offense but the individual defendant”). 
 295. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239–50 (2011) (emphasizing 
the broad range of evidence about the individual that trial courts may consider when 
imposing a sentence); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding resulting 
in the federal Sentencing Guidelines becoming advisory, rather than mandatory); Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (holding the state’s implementation of a determinate 
sentencing scheme unconstitutional, effectively making the state guidelines advisory instead 
of mandatory). 
 296. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 297. Id. at 245. 
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and the punishment to ensue.”298 
Federal district court judges are constantly sentencing individual 
defendants; these judges are appropriately situated and experienced in this 
area.  Not only do federal district court judges have an “institutional 
advantage” over federal appellate judges,299 district court judges occupy a 
uniquely different position from legislators.  Most district court judges 
sentence over 100 defendants every year.300  Rather than creating policy of 
general applicability, a “judge sees and hears the evidence, makes 
credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains 
insights” in every case he decides.301 
Since the sentencing judge is the most familiar with the defendant,302 he 
should receive discretion.  By allowing sentencing judges to address 
juvenile-age convictions as one consideration under § 3553(a), rather than 
as rigid predicate offenses that trigger heightened penalties under § 
841(b)(1)(A), the criminal justice system will stay true to the ideal of 
individualized sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Graham v. Florida demands that the 
American criminal justice system critically reexamine a number of its 
underlying doctrines and sentencing practices.  Based on Graham v. 
Florida, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause forbids using juvenile-
age convictions as strikes to trigger mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life without 
parole.  In view of jurisdictions’ legislation and actual sentencing practices, 
the United States lacks a clear national consensus on how to view this type 
of sentencing practice.  Yet drug traffickers who have juvenile-age strikes 
are not culpable enough to deserve the extreme punishment of life without 
parole.  Also, this sentence does not definitively serve any legitimate 
penological goal for this class of offenders.  Further, the manner in which 
the international community views juvenile criminal conduct and drug 
offenses confirms that life without parole is cruel and unusual in this 
instance. 
As a result, under § 841(b)(1)(A), Angelo Scott should have been subject 
to a ten-year mandatory minimum, and Donald Graham should have been 
                                                          
 298. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996); accord Pennsylvania ex rel. 
Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (“For the determination of sentences, justice 
generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was 
committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together 
with the character and propensities of the offender.”). 
 299. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. 
 300. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 n.7 (2007) (examining the average 
number of defendants the district court judge had sentenced in a given year). 
 301. Id. at 51 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 302. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). 
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subject to a twenty-year mandatory minimum.  Each defendant could have 
received a sentence longer than the mandatory minimum, though, because 
sentencing judges can—and should—consider juvenile-age convictions 
under § 3553(a).  Section 3553(a) ensures that all criminal defendants are 
evaluated on an individual basis.  As such, the Eighth Amendment 
commands that Angelo Scott and Donald Graham receive individualized 
treatment.  They should not spend the rest of their lives in jail due to the 
rigidity of § 841(b)(1)(A)’s three-strike sentencing scheme. 
 
